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Abstract 
 
While integration in Europe is, in several important aspects, already more advanced than it was in 
America during the decades prior to the American Civil War, there are important differences that make 
deeper political integration comprising all members of the European Union unlikely in the near term. A 
smaller group of EU members, however, is likely to continue towards deeper integration, although 
questions of constitutional legitimacy must be confronted and resolved. European integrationists may 
find the federalist principles of James Madison, regarded as the father of the American Constitution, 
valuable both for deeper integration and wider expansion. A Madisonian federal model for Europe could 
prove acceptable both to many euro-federalists and euro-sceptics and thus advance the cause of 
European integration. Ironically, a European federal union based on Madisonian principles would be 
much closer to the vision of many of America’s founders than the federal structure of present-day 
America.  
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n 29 October 2004, leaders of the 25 member states 
of the European Union met in Rome to sign a 
proposed Constitution, thus beginning what 
promised to be a long and contentious process of 
ratification requiring the assent of each EU member. Recent 
public opinion polls and debates over the proposed 
Constitution in both France and the Netherlands illustrate 
just how contentious the ratification process has become. 
Whether France or the Netherlands puts a brake on 
ratification or gives it a grudging green light, Europeans 
who are debating their constitutional future would do well 
to consider the lessons available from the history of 
constitutional federalism in America. Both euro-federalists 
who favour an eventual, politically integrated United States 
of Europe and euro-sceptics who fear such a prospect 
would perhaps be surprised by the many similarities and the 
important differences between the American experience 
and the path Europe is on now.  
It is my argument that integration in Europe along the 
federal model is, in several important aspects, already more 
advanced than it was in America during the decades prior 
to the American Civil War. The American evolution into a 
deeply integrated political structure was not inevitable, 
however; nor is it in Europe. On the contrary, for a variety 
of reasons, an even-deeper political integration comprising 
all members of the EU is unlikely in the near term. A 
smaller group of members, however, may choose to 
continue towards deeper integration, although questions of 
constitutional legitimacy must be confronted and resolved. 
In pursuing further integration, Europeans should consider 
the federal model envisioned by James Madison, regarded 
as the father of the American Constitution. A genuine 
Madisonian model could eventually prove acceptable both 
to euro-federalists and euro-sceptics, thereby advancing the 
cause of European integration. A European federal union 
based on Madisonian principles would, ironically, be much 
closer to the union envisioned by many of America’s 
founders than is the federal structure of present-day 
America. 
1.  Questions Posed by the Proposed EU 
Constitution 
Political integration can take two basic forms. In a federal 
structure the nation-state divides significant powers 
between the national government and sub-national, usually 
regional, governments. The United States of America, 
Canada and Germany are well-known federal structures in 
which important powers are allocated to the sub-national 
levels of government. In contrast to federal structures are 
nation-states with unitary systems, in which little if any 
significant powers are allocated to sub-national 
governments. Well-known examples of unitary systems 
include the United Kingdom and France, although the UK 
under the Blair government has devolved some powers to 
new regional assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The contrasting systems for the distribution of 
governmental power have been described as ‘pluricentric’ 
and ‘monocentric’.
1 
The most important case study of developing federalism in 
today’s world is the European Union, currently debating the 
Constitution drafted by a convention under the 
chairmanship of former French President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing. The use of the word ‘constitution’ to describe 
this document cannot be dismissed as of merely semantic 
interest. Prior to now, the EU and its predecessors have 
operated through treaties, from Rome to Maastricht to Nice. 
The difference between a constitution and a treaty is 
fundamental. A treaty is a pact among sovereign states. A 
constitution is the governing document for a sovereign 
political entity and, in the Western tradition of Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau, a contract between the governors and 
the governed. Interestingly, the EU itself refers to the 
proposal as a ‘Constitutional Treaty’
2 in an apparent effort 
to give comfort simultaneously both to euro-federalists and 
euro-sceptics.  
Europeans must consider a range of important questions in 
deciding whether to ratify the proposed Constitution: By 
adopting its first constitution, will the EU inevitably he 
headed down the road to a federal nation-state? Will it be 
comparable in constitutional structure to the United States 
of America? Will the proposed or any future EU 
Constitution be legitimate if it is ratified by parliaments 
rather than through popular referenda?  
                                                 
1 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Explaining Government 
Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security 
Policy”, International Organization 58, Winter 2004, p. 148. 
2 The official name of the document is “Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe,” according to the document from the 
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, Brussels, 29 October 2004 (available at 
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/constitution_en.htm) (hereinafter 
called “EU Constitution”). 
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During its founding era, America’s Founding Fathers drew 
important lessons from Europe. Now European 
integrationists could learn some valuable lessons from the 
American experience with constitutional federalism.  
2.  The EU Today Is More Integrated than the 
Early US 
Today’s 25-nation behemoth called the European Union 
began as a small organisation named the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The original 
members were West Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Italy. The Treaty of Rome in 
1957 expanded the scope from coal and steel into a broader 
common market comprising the same six countries. The 
Treaty of Rome contained language that reflected its 
signatories’ pledge to launch a process of ‘ever closer 
union’, a term that was left for future Europeans to define.  
The European common market’s initial economic success 
was stunning. Its original members, situated in the heart of 
continental Europe, had been devastated by World War II. 
By 1970, they had miraculously achieved a level of 
prosperity that few would have dreamed possible viewing 
the smoking ruins of these countries just a quarter-century 
earlier, on V-E Day in 1945. The prosperity of the 
European Economic Community, as it was then known, led 
other nations to seek membership. The UK, Ireland and 
Denmark joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and 
Portugal in 1986, Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. In 
2004, the ‘Big Bang’ expansion took place, with ten new 
countries joining what was now called the European Union: 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.  
In anticipation of the Big Bang accession, the EU convened 
its first constitutional convention. The process of drafting 
and subsequently ratifying a constitution has forced the EU 
to confront the seminal question that it has deliberately 
managed to avoid since the Treaty of Rome in 1957: What 
is the ultimate goal of the process of “ever closer union” 
declared in the Treaty of Rome?  
The EU today is clearly more than an economic alliance. 
While it was launched by the original six members to foster 
economic recovery from the wholesale devastation of the 
Second World War, its founders did not conceal the 
political dimension. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign 
Minister who proposed European integration on 9 May 
1950, and Jean Monnet, first President of the ECSC’s High 
Authority, believed that political integration could prevent 
future continental wars, which the earlier Treaties of 
Westphalia, Vienna and Versailles – based as they were on 
a system of independent and competing European states – 
had failed to prevent. 
Some of the members who joined later, however, 
particularly the UK, rejected the idea that ‘ever closer 
union’ meant an inexorable journey to a European federal 
state. They saw the European common market as simply 
that: a large free-trade zone and preferably little more. The 
two competing visions for the European project since the 
UK joined in 1973 can be characterised as the British 
vision of ‘wider and shallower’ – expanding the free-trade 
zone into as many countries as possible while curbing the 
growth of the EU as a budding superstate – versus the 
Franco-German vision of ‘deeper and narrower’ – 
promoting the political integration of the EU as more 
important than expanding the free-trade zone.  
The final phase-in of the euro as the common currency in 
12 of the EU’s continental members, including France and 
Germany, on 1 January 2002 was “not only the crowning-
point of economic integration, it was also a profoundly 
political act,” according to German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer in his speech calling for a European 
Federation at Humboldt University in Berlin in 2000.
3 
While the adoption of the euro served the Franco-German 
vision of deeper political integration, the accession of ten 
new members in 2004 served the British vision of a wider, 
shallower free-trade zone. It was no coincidence that 
France was deeply reluctant to agree to the Big Bang 
accession. France would probably have acted to stop or at 
least delay it, had not its historical partner in EU affairs, 
Germany, expected both economic and political benefits 
from EU membership for the Central and Eastern European 
countries on Germany’s borders and split from France on 
this issue.  
The EU that today is deciding whether to ratify its first 
Constitution is obviously not a United States of Europe. 
Yet a comparison to the American experience indicates that 
in many important ways the EU is already far more 
politically and economically integrated than the United 
States was in its earliest years. 
Most Europeans – indeed most Americans – think of the 
US as a single nation-state that came into existence during 
the founding era that ran roughly from the Declaration of 
Independence on the Fourth of July in 1776 through the 
drafting and ratification of the Constitution in 1787-88. A 
BBC News correspondent recently exemplified this view of 
American history when he wrote that the proposed EU 
Constitution would not set up a United States of Europe 
because, in contrast to EU Constitution framers, “[t]he 
Americans in their Constitutional Convention in 1787 were 
single-mindedly determined to set up a new nation and did 
so”.
4 That statement, however much it reflects 
contemporary thought, is inaccurate on two counts: First, 
the framers of the American Constitution were certainly not 
of a single mind as to what type of federal structure they 
were creating, and second, it took a catastrophic civil war 
many decades later to transform the US into a nation state. 
The 13 British colonies in North America who banded 
together to fight the Crown did declare themselves newly 
                                                 
3 Joschka Fischer, “From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts 
on the Finality of European Integration”, speech at the Humboldt 
University, Berlin, 12 May 2000. 
4 Paul Reynolds, “Constitution a hard-won compromise,” 18 June 
2004, BBC News Online. Political Integration in Europe and America| 3 
independent states in 1776. The next year the Congress of 
the states produced a document called the Articles of 
Confederation (‘ Articles’), which was intended to serve as 
an organisational plan for this new political entity called the 
United States of America.
5 (The Articles, by the way, 
offered membership to Canada,
6 which declined and has 
been emphasising its separateness from its southern 
neighbours ever since.) The Articles were not finally 
ratified by all 13 states until 1781, the year that George 
Washington’s victory over Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, 
Virginia established independence in fact as well as 
rhetoric. 
Yet independence for the 13 states did not mean that a new 
nation state, federal or unitary in structure, had come into 
existence. On the contrary, with the British enemy 
withdrawn, the states immediately began quarrelling among 
themselves and drifting more apart than together. They 
continually erected protectionist barriers to trade across 
state lines. Pennsylvania tradesmen lobbied their legislature 
for protection from New York tradesmen, Virginia farmers 
lobbied for protection from North Carolina farmers. 
Debtors lobbied legislatures for protection from creditors, 
sometimes even resorting to violence. In one egregious 
episode, a former officer in the American army named 
Daniel Shays led an armed rebellion in Massachusetts that 
went on for several months in 1786. Shay’s forces stormed 
several Massachusetts courthouses to prevent farm 
foreclosures and made other demands of the state 
government. Bowing to popular pressure, state legislatures 
frequently enacted laws that nullified property and 
contractual rights, and there was no national entity, 
executive or judicial, to enforce those rights against state 
violations of them. Individual states printed and coined 
their own, often worthless, money. The US under the 
Articles was on the verge of both commercial and even 
political anarchy. 
In stark contrast, the EU has virtually eliminated trade 
barriers among its members and has adopted and enforces 
some common contractual, intellectual and other property 
rights. Within the eurozone of the EU, there is a common 
currency. The eurozone also has a central bank, something 
the US did not establish on a permanent basis until the early 
20
th century. 
The EU is not only far more economically integrated today 
than the US was under the Articles, but in several important 
ways the EU is more politically integrated as well. The 
status of political integration in the early years of the US 
was described by Chief Justice John Marshall in the 
Supreme Court case of Gibbons v. Ogden. Marshall 
described the states during the Articles period as 
“sovereign…completely independent… connected with 
                                                 
5 Act of Confederation of the United States of America, Congress 
of the United States of America, 15 November 1777, adopting 
Articles of Confederation (hereinafter “Articles”). 
6 Ibid., Art. XI. 
each other only by a league”.
7 Under the Articles, the 
national government consisted primarily of a legislative 
branch, the Congress, and had little executive power, no 
judicial power and no power of taxation. While the EU 
today does not have the power of direct taxation, it does 
have a large and increasingly powerful executive 
bureaucracy in Brussels that issues rules and regulations 
that affect individual citizens and businesses in EU member 
states. These rules represent a plethora of environmental 
and social regulations, from the dimensions of workplace 
tools to packaged food hygiene standards. The EU today is 
a factor in the daily lives of its citizens to a much greater 
degree than the American federal government ever was 
during the early decades of the US.  
3.  Identical Issues Debated in the EU and the 
US  
The disastrous commercial chaos under the Articles finally 
motivated the Virginia legislature to invite other states to 
join them in an effort to address that issue, and that issue 
solely. Most state legislatures that agreed to send delegates 
to a Convention to meet in the spring of 1787 in 
Philadelphia gave their delegates marching orders merely to 
amend the Articles to fix the commerce problem, not to 
write a new constitution.  
The Philadelphia Convention obviously proceeded to go far 
beyond that limited purpose. Meeting in sessions from 
which the public and the press were barred and observing a 
pledge of secrecy, the delegates, with political leadership 
from Convention Chairman George Washington and 
intellectual leadership from James Madison of Virginia, 
and James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris of 
Pennsylvania, instead produced an entirely new plan of 
government for the United States, a constitution.  
Far from a gathering of leaders united in a single-minded 
determination to produce a new nation, however, the 
Convention was rife with competing agendas and divergent 
visions for the union. The Convention has been called the 
‘miracle at Philadelphia’
8 because the delegates even 
managed to agree at all on a new Constitution. While the 
Convention sessions were secret, James Madison kept 
copious notes. The debates were intense, often strident. 
Any number of times, the Convention was in danger of 
complete collapse. State delegations frequently threatened 
to walk out, and most of the New York delegation did walk 
out and refused to sign the final document. Rhode Island 
refused even to send a delegation. The vote to recommend 
the Constitution for ratification was not unanimous. The 
Virginia delegation was split, with Madison voting in 
                                                 
7 Supreme Court of the United States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
8 Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story of 
the Constitutional Convention May-September 1787, Back Bay 
Books; 1
st ed., 1986. This book contains an excellent and detailed 
account of the events and debates during the Philadelphia 
Convention. 4 | Mark C. Christie 
favour, but George Mason and Edmund Randolph voting 
against. Virginian Patrick Henry, of “Give me liberty or 
give me death!” fame, was not a delegate and articulated 
his view of the Philadelphia Convention with the equally 
immortal words, “I smell a rat!”  
Many of the most important issues that were so contentious 
in Philadelphia in 1787 were identical to those the EU is 
debating today. Two issues tower above all others: First, 
what shall be the formula for allocating representation (and 
thus influence) among member states in the new federal 
union, and second, what shall be the allocation of powers 
between the new federal government and the member state 
governments? 
The EU has generally followed the principle of allocating 
member states a fixed number of votes with each member 
having a veto. During negotiations over the EU 
Constitution, proposed changes to this formula were hotly 
debated. Many felt that Spain and Poland, for example, had 
exaggerated voting rights, and France tried to maintain 
equal voting rights with Germany, despite Germany’s 
significantly larger population. In a manner similar though 
not identical, the US under the Articles allocated each state 
one fixed vote, although no state had a veto.
9 
The intensity of the EU debates over the voting formula 
resembles that of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. 
Failure to agree on this crucial issue repeatedly threatened 
to destroy the effort to write an American Constitution. At 
the beginning of the Convention, the Virginia delegation 
proposed the Virginia Plan, drafted largely by James 
Madison. Virginia at the time had the largest population of 
any state and the Virginia Plan proposed a two-house 
legislature with representation in both houses based upon 
population. Through no coincidence this formula would 
have given Virginia the most representation – and influence 
– in the new federal government. 
Unsurprisingly, the small states objected strenuously and 
threatened to scuttle the entire project if the Virginia Plan 
were adopted. New Jersey, then a small state, proposed its 
own plan. It continued the one-state, one-vote, one-house 
formula of the Articles. The big states refused to agree. 
Things were at a standstill as the stifling heat and humidity 
of summertime Philadelphia long before air conditioning 
bore down on the delegates. 
Then, Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed what was 
later termed the ‘Great Compromise’. It was so logical one 
wonders why it was not proposed sooner. He took the 
Virginia Plan’s two-house legislature and based 
representation in one house on population (with a census 
and reallocation of seats every ten years), but based 
representation in the other house on absolute equality 
among the states. The stalemate was broken and to this day 
the United States Congress consists of a House of 
Representatives based on population, in which California 
currently has 53 members and Delaware has but one, and 
(evoking the Roman Republic) a Senate, in which 
                                                 
9 Articles, Arts. V and X. 
California, Delaware, and every other state has the same 
number of members: two.
10 Equality of representation for 
each state in the Senate is permanently guaranteed in the 
Constitution and immune from amendment.
11 
What the Giscard Convention proposed is quite 
complicated and difficult for the European man in the street 
to understand, no small matter when the fate of the 
proposed Constitution is to be decided in several popular 
referenda.
12 Majority voting is expanded through a complex 
device called ‘qualified majority voting’ which does take 
into account somewhat the population of the voting 
members.
13 Representation in the European Parliament is 
described as ‘degressively proportional’ with no member 
getting fewer than six nor more than 96 seats.
14 In some 
ways the proposed EU Constitution moves closer to the 
American model in the legislative area. Most European 
legislation will have to be passed jointly by both the 
Parliament and the Council,
15 which is similar to the 
American Constitution’s House-Senate structure, and the 
one-member veto is eliminated in a number of policy areas, 
though importantly, not from foreign policy, defence or 
taxation.
16 
The second major question the Philadelphia Convention 
fought over was the allocation of powers between the 
federal and state governments. Europeans who are 
dispirited at the intense disagreement within the EU over 
this issue should take heart. This issue was not settled in 
America at the Philadelphia Convention either. Certainly 
the 1787 Constitution greatly expanded the structure of the 
federal government, adding separate executive and judicial 
branches to the existing legislative branch. Several new and 
important powers were given to the federal government that 
                                                 
10 One commentator has pointed out that this “federal structure 
favors the overrepresentation of smaller territorial units”. See 
Sergio Fabrini, “Transatlantic constitutionalism: Comparing the 
United States and European Union”, European Journal of 
Political Research 43, June 2004, pp. 553-54. The Senate, 
however, was established not to represent the people directly or 
equally, but the states as quasi-sovereign political units. Fabrini 
accurately notes that this formula impacts substantially the 
election of the chief executive, the president, because each state’s 
number of votes in the Electoral College is the total of its 
representatives and senators. 
11 Constitution of the United States of America (hereinafter “US 
Constitution”), Art. V. 
12 Two commentators wrote: “A voting regime that requires 
recourse to calculators and multiple sources of rules is in danger 
of rendering the Council process even less intelligible than it is at 
present.” See Alan Dashwood and Angus Johnston, “The 
Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the 
Constitutional Treaty”, 41 Common Market Law Review 1481, 
1499-1500 (2004). I am indebted to Professor Angus Johnston for 
several suggestions that have assisted me in the preparation of this 
article.  
13 EU Constitution, Art. I-25. 
14 Ibid., Art. I-20. 
15 Ibid., Art. I-34. 
16 Ibid., Arts. I-40, I-41 and I-54. Political Integration in Europe and America| 5 
it did not have under the Articles, including specific powers 
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to borrow 
money (a power well-used ever since), to tax (but not 
incomes), to control immigration, to establish a national 
currency, and to issue copyrights and patents to protect 
intellectual property and inventions.  
On the other hand, Madison and other framers believed that 
all powers not specifically listed as a federal power in the 
American Constitution had been retained by the states, 
including such critically important areas of policy as 
education and what is called the ‘police power’. The police 
power covers a huge swath of laws governing human 
activity, from criminal laws to public morals laws such as 
those governing gambling and the consumption of beer, 
wine and liquor, to family laws governing marriage, 
divorce, adoption, child custody, abortion, and sexual and 
medical practices. A myriad of issues that affect 
Americans’ daily lives were assumed to have remained 
matters of state, not federal, authority.
17  
Unlike the proposed EU Constitution, which contains a 
detailed list of guaranteed rights in its Charter of 
Fundamental Rights,
18 the original American Constitution 
contained very few guarantees of individual rights and 
liberties. The Bill of Rights, added to the Constitution in 
1791 as the first ten amendments, did guarantee such 
monumental individual rights as freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom to assemble 
and petition the government, and the right to trial by jury 
and against self-incrimination in criminal trials, but these 
rights of individuals were protected only against violation 
by the federal government, which the framers feared the 
most, not against violation by state governments. The 
protection of individual rights and liberties was largely left 
to state constitutions, which had been adopted following the 
Declaration of Independence. The fact that the 1787 
Constitution gave the federal government little power to 
protect fundamental human rights allowed slavery to 
continue in the southern states, reinforced by state laws, 
long after northern states had abolished slavery, and thus 
delayed the day of reckoning over the issue that represents 
the worst stain on American history. 
The Founding Fathers, however, did not agree on the exact 
contours of federal versus state powers. Two of the most 
important, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, 
subsequently wrote one of history’s most remarkable pieces 
of political propaganda to persuade the public to support 
ratification of the proposed constitution. Labelled The 
Federalist Papers, these were opinion columns of their day 
and appeared in New York newspapers as New Yorkers 
were debating ratification. In these essays, Madison and 
                                                 
17 The EU bans any member state from using the death penalty, a 
ban that is continued in the proposed EU Constitution in Art. II-
62. EU elites are appalled that the death penalty is used in the US. 
However, in the American federal structure this matter, as one of 
criminal law, has historically been left to the states. Many states 
do apply the death penalty, whereas others have banned it.  
18 EU Constitution, Part II. 
Hamilton separately explained the new federal structure 
created by the proposed Constitution. Yet in Madison’s 
essays the states were stronger players in the new federal 
structure than in Hamilton’s.
19 In the years following 
ratification, Madison, along with political ally Thomas 
Jefferson, increasingly advocated preserving the powers of 
the states and bitterly criticised Hamilton and other 
advocates of strong central government. 
The 1787 Constitution was ambiguous as to the nature of 
the federal structure it created. It certainly created a federal 
union more integrated than the league of sovereign states 
barely held together by the Articles of Confederation. Yet it 
did not create a nation state. Madison described the 1787 
Constitution as having both federal and national 
characteristics, although he emphasised the “residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty” of the states over all matters not 
specifically delegated to the central government.
20 The 
word ‘nation’ does not even appear in the 1787 
Constitution. Many questions as to the exact powers of the 
new federal government versus the existing state 
governments were largely left to future generations to 
answer. Those in the EU who question what type of entity 
they are creating with their proposed Constitution may well 
look at the American example and conclude, accurately, 
that it is far too soon to tell. 
4.  Lincoln’s Vision of an American Nation 
The simple truth is that the US evolved into its modern 
status as nation-state primarily because of one man: 
Abraham Lincoln. 
Lincoln single-handedly and single-mindedly, through four 
blood-soaked years of civil war, imposed his vision of the 
United States of America in place of the federal structure 
the 1787 Constitution had created. Lincoln’s vision was 
spelled out explicitly in his Gettysburg Address, delivered 
in November 1863 during the dedication of a cemetery for 
the thousands of Union soldiers who had died a few months 
earlier in the most important battle of the war.  
In his address, Lincoln famously began, “Four score and 
seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this 
continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated 
to the proposition that all men are created equal…”
21 
[emphasis added] 
Four score and seven years prior to Lincoln’s speech at 
Gettysburg was 1776, the year of the Declaration of 
Independence. For Lincoln, that was the true founding 
moment of the American republic, not the Philadelphia 
Convention of 1787, and the Declaration of Independence 
was the true founding charter, not the Philadelphia 
Constitution. At Gettysburg Lincoln answered the decades-
                                                 
19 See, e.g., James Madison, The Federalist Number 46, 29 
January 1788. 
20 James Madison, The Federalist Number 39, 16 January 1788. 
21 Abraham Lincoln, “Address Dedicating the National Military 
Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania”, 19 November 1863. 6 | Mark C. Christie 
old question of what was actually created at the Founding 
by proclaiming that it was a new nation, not a league of 
sovereign states bound only by a treaty, not a loose 
confederacy. Before the American Civil War, people 
commonly referred to ‘these United States’ in the plural; 
after the war the common term became what it is today, 
‘the United States’, singular. Some historians have written 
that the triumph of Lincoln’s vision of the American 
republic represented a Second American Revolution.
22 
The victors, of course, get to write the history, but was 
Lincoln’s characterisation of the original federal structure 
and its founding moment correct? With all due respect to 
Lincoln, who saved the American union, I must conclude 
that his description of the genesis of the republic is 
incorrect from both legal and historical standpoints. 
Most importantly, the Declaration of Independence was not 
a blueprint for a new republic, so it could not have been the 
founding charter of the US. It declared that those British 
colonies in North America whose representatives in the 
Congress had signed the document were now independent. 
It stated a long list of grievances against the Crown, in the 
manner of a plaintiff’s bill of particulars against a 
defendant. It, of course, boldly declared “that all Men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness, – That to secure these 
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed…”
23 
This statement of the nature of legitimate government came 
directly from the political philosophy of the European 
Enlightenment, more specifically from British philosopher 
John Locke.
24 The authors of the Declaration, which 
included primary author Thomas Jefferson, but also 
included Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, were all well 
read in European Enlightenment political philosophy. 
The Declaration of Independence was many things, but it 
was not a constitution for a new federal republic. By its 
own Lockean description of legitimate government, the 
Declaration could not represent the institution of a new 
government. The Declaration did not originate with the 
people. It was adopted by representatives from the state 
legislatures to the Congress. The fact that the colonies, now 
states, won the war against the King’s forces did not 
retroactively convert the Declaration into a blueprint for a 
new national government to which the American people 
had given their consent.  
                                                 
22 James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second 
American Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1992, and Garry 
Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America, 
Simon & Schuster, 1993. Both authors have written brilliantly of 
Lincoln’s transformational role in American constitutional history 
and I am indebted to both of them for much of the historical 
analysis incorporated in this paragraph. 
23 Declaration of Independence, Congress of the United States of 
America, 4 July 1776. 
24 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, The Second 
Treatise, Chap. VIII. 
By contrast, the 1787 Constitution was a blueprint for a 
new federal republic and it was launched with the consent 
of the governed. The constitution was ratified by 
conventions in the states elected by the people for that sole 
purpose. One may argue, as some do today, that the people 
deciding whether to ratify was limited to propertied white 
men. That is obviously true, but it is also true that by the 
standards of the world as it existed in 1787 and by the 
standards of world history, the process by which the 
American Constitution was adopted was far more 
democratic in nature that the institution of most previous – 
and many subsequent – forms of government on any 
continent.  
Thus Lincoln was simply wrong to proclaim that 1776 was 
the founding moment of the American federal republic, and 
his characterisation of the political entity that was created at 
that moment as one nation was equally wrong. Lincoln’s 
assertion would have been vociferously challenged by 
many of the Founding Fathers themselves, most 
importantly by Thomas Jefferson, primary author of the 
document Lincoln claimed was the founding charter, and 
James Madison, regarded as the father of the Constitution.  
On another critically important issue facing the young 
republic, however, Lincoln was most assuredly correct. He 
believed that the American union was perpetual and that 
withdrawal from that union by an individual state was 
impermissible under the Constitution. 
While the Articles described the states as retaining their 
sovereignty and independence, it also described the union 
of those states as ‘perpetual’.
25 The 1787 Constitution did 
not use the word “perpetual” to describe the union, but said 
in its preamble that among its purposes was to “form a 
more perfect union” and the framers were clearly aware 
that the union they were perfecting was declared to be 
perpetual in the Articles. The Constitution contains no 
provision by which the union could dissolve itself, 
buttressing the idea that it was perpetual. While it contains 
specific mechanisms for new states to join the union or to 
be created from within existing ones,
26 there has never been 
any provision for an individual state to secede from the 
union. We can only conclude that the framers, who 
intensely disagreed on many details of the new 
government’s powers, did share a consensus that once a 
state’s citizens had ratified the Constitution, secession by 
that state from the union was not allowable.  
While Lincoln and Madison would have disagreed about 
the proper allocation of powers between the federal and 
state governments, Lincoln’s view on secession was 
consistent with Madison’s description of America as a 
“compound republic”, consisting of two separate and 
equally legitimate levels of government, federal and state, 
both of which drew their powers directly from the consent 
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of the people.
27 Since the people had consented to be 
governed by both the state and federal governments when 
they ratified both state and federal Constitutions, no state 
government could later withdraw from the union.  
Lincoln’s view draws further historical support from Chief 
Justice John Marshall. He described the launch of the 
republic in the 1819 landmark case of McCulloch v. 
Maryland: 
… [C]ounsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of 
some importance, in the construction of the constitution, 
to consider that instrument not as emanating from the 
people, but as the act of sovereign and independent 
States. The powers of the general government, it has 
been said, are delegated by the States, who alone are 
truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination 
to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion. 
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The 
Convention which framed the constitution was indeed 
elected by the State legislatures. But the instrument, 
when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, 
without obligation or pretensions to it. It was reported to 
the then existing Congress of the United States, with a 
request that it might “be submitted to a Convention of 
Delegates, chosen in each State by the people thereof, 
under the recommendation of its Legislature, for their 
assent and ratification.” This mode of proceeding was 
adopted; and by the Convention, by Congress, and by the 
State Legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the 
people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which 
they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a 
subject, by assembling in Convention. It is true, they 
assembled in their several States – and where else should 
they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever 
wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which 
separate the States, and of compounding the American 
people into one common mass. Of consequence, when 
they act, they act in their States. But the measures they 
adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures 
of the people themselves, or become the measures of the 
State governments.  
From these Conventions the constitution derives its 
whole authority. The government proceeds directly from 
the people; is “ordained and established” in the name of 
the people; and is declared to be ordained, “in order to 
form a more perfect union…” The assent of the States, in 
their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a 
Convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the 
people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept 
or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the 
affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State 
governments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was 
of complete obligation, and bound the State 
sovereignties…  
…To the formation of a league, such as was the 
confederation, the State sovereignties were certainly 
competent. But when, “in order to form a more perfect 
union,” it was deemed necessary to change this alliance 
                                                 
27 James Madison, The Federalist Number 51, 6 February 1788. 
into an effective government, possessing great and 
sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people, the 
necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its 
powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged 
by all.
28 [emphases added] 
Marshall’s opinion embodies Madison’s view of the 
American compound republic. It supports Lincoln’s belief 
that the federal government drew its powers directly from 
the people and thus no state government could withdraw 
from the constitutional union. While Marshall’s opinion 
supports Lincoln on secession, he implicitly contradicts 
Lincoln’s view that the Declaration of Independence was 
the founding charter of the American republic. It could not 
have been, because it was an act of the states acting in 
Congress and was not an act of the people themselves. 
Debates over the legal and historical accuracy of Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address became academic, however, with the 
eventual victory of Lincoln’s armies in the Civil War and 
the subsequent adoption of the 13
th, 14
th and 15
th 
amendments to the Constitution. Labelled the ‘Civil War 
amendments’, these constitutional provisions transformed 
the United States of America from an ambiguously defined 
union of quasi-sovereign states into Lincoln’s vision of a 
single nation-state.
29 This radical break in the evolution of 
American federalism is illustrated by the fact that the first 
eleven amendments to the Constitution, all adopted prior to 
the Civil War, limited the powers of the federal 
government, whereas the post-war 13
th through 16
th 
amendments dramatically expanded the powers of the 
federal government versus the states.
30 
Although Lincoln’s vision of the union as nation prevailed 
and the antebellum republic was destroyed by civil war, the 
exact allocation of specific powers and roles between the 
federal and state governments continued – and continues to 
this day – to be a source of debate, political contention and 
litigation in America. Even Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, while asserting that the federal 
government drew its powers directly from the people and 
not by delegation from the states, went on to say that “… 
the question respecting the extent of the powers actually 
granted [by the Constitution to the federal government] is 
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as 
long as our system shall exist”. 
                                                 
28 Supreme Court of the United States, McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
29 The 13
th amendment abolished slavery and other forms of 
involuntary servitude throughout the US. The 14
th amendment 
created American citizenship as a legal status for the first time, 
with its own rights and privileges; previously Americans had 
individual rights and privileges only through their status as 
citizens of their home state. The 14
th amendment also guaranteed 
all American citizens equal protection of the laws. The 15
th 
amendment guaranteed voting rights to freed slaves and 
Americans of African descent. Each amendment included a 
specific provision giving Congress the power to legislate to 
enforce these rights against violations by state governments. 
30 The 16
th amendment, ratified in 1913, gave the federal 
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5.  Lessons for the EU 
The American experience with federalism holds several 
lessons for Europeans today as they consider the proposed 
Constitution, and in a larger sense, the future of the EU. 
First, the ambiguity surrounding the EU’s goal of ‘ever 
closer union’ is unsurprising. It resembles the deep 
ambiguity about the nature of the American union that 
prevailed from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to 
the Civil War and constitutional changes made in its 
aftermath. In one sense, both the original American 
Constitution and the proposed EU Constitution were and 
are Rorschach blots: people see in them what they want to 
see. Just as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson saw the 1787 Constitution in radically 
different ways, today euro-federalists and euro-sceptics can 
find cause for both comfort and fear in the proposed EU 
Constitution. 
The debates are remarkably similar. Just as Alexander 
Hamilton advocated a unified American nation state, 
deeply integrated economically and politically, so did 
Joschka Fischer in his Humboldt University speech express 
the hopes of Europeans who wish for the transformation of 
the EU into an integrated political federation. And just as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison expressed bitter 
hostility towards Hamilton and other advocates of a 
powerful central government, so today the euro-sceptics, 
especially in the UK, express alarm over what they 
perceive as the threat to their sovereignty and liberties from 
Brussels bureaucrats. 
Second, whether the EU will eventually become an 
American-style federal union is not pre-ordained, 
regardless of what is written on paper. While the EU 
already has some of the accoutrements of the nation state, 
including a flag, an anthem, a motto and a ‘national day’,
31 
and while it is already far more integrated than the 
American states were in the years immediately following 
independence from Great Britain, there are several 
obstacles to even deeper integration that differentiate the 
EU today from the US during its founding era.  
While each of the 13 original American states had its own 
cherished independence, sovereign government and unique 
political culture, they all shared a common language 
(English), a common religion and culture influenced by that 
religion (Protestant Christianity
32), common legal 
principles based on English law, and a common history as a 
people who had fought and bled together against a common 
enemy for independence. The last was what Abraham 
Lincoln invoked in his First Inaugural Address when he 
extolled “the mystic chords of memory, stretching from 
every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and 
                                                 
31 EU Constitution, Art. I-8. The EU motto – ‘United in diversity’ 
– unintentionally argues for a Madisonian constitutional model 
for Europe. 
32 The exception was Maryland, which was founded by Lord 
Baltimore as a haven for Roman Catholics. 
hearthstone all over this broad land…”
33 in a desperate final 
effort to dissuade secessionist southerners from taking up 
arms against the federal government. This shared history 
did not prevent civil war in 1861, but it was critically 
important in re-uniting Americans after 1865. 
By contrast, while English is rapidly becoming the 
dominant language of EU commerce and higher education, 
at the ground level, among the many nationalities and 
ethnic groups of the now 25-member EU, the reality is a 
multiplicity of languages. The wide array of spoken and 
written languages among EU peoples should not be 
underestimated as an obstacle to the transformation of the 
EU into Fischer’s federation. 
While the EU is Christian in heritage, it is increasingly a 
continent of the adamantly secular with a growing Muslim 
minority, and it has recently begun the process of 
negotiating the admission of Turkey, a Muslim country. It 
is no coincidence that many French and Germans, who 
have long been among the most vocal advocates of deeper 
EU federalism, are also among the most reluctant to admit 
Turkey. They fear that the accession of Turkey could 
represent a huge step away from deeper political union and 
towards the British vision of the EU as primarily a free-
trade zone.  
Europeans, rather than sharing a history of bleeding and 
fighting together against common external enemies, have 
repeatedly fought and killed each other. The French and 
German founders of the EU predecessor organisation 
clearly saw it as a political tool to prevent future destructive 
wars between their countries, which had fought each other 
three times between 1870 and 1945. The Dutch, Belgians 
and Luxembourgers – the grass who were trampled 
underfoot when the German and French elephants fought – 
shared the same political goal for the organisation. The 
British, who joined much later, did not. While Britain had 
participated in most of Europe’s major wars, protected by 
the Channel it never suffered invasion after 1066 and has 
regarded political union with the continent with scepticism, 
even hostility. As former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher once said, “In my lifetime all our problems have 
come from mainland Europe and all the solutions from the 
English-speaking nations across the world”.
34  
The EU has been fabulously successful in bringing to 
Europe the longest sustained period of peace and prosperity 
in its modern history, but that does not create the type of 
European national consciousness and patriotism that are 
necessary to build and sustain a nation state. EU citizens 
have never fought together as Europeans under a common 
flag against an existential threat, as Americans frequently 
have. Let us hope that Europeans never have to wage such 
a war (although many would argue Europeans face just 
such a threat now, from Islamic jihadists), but this 
historical factor, along with the lack of a common 
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language, clearly represent major obstacles to the creation 
of a politically integrated European federation. European 
elites who advocate that the EU should be a paragon of 
‘soft power’, eschewing military force for diplomacy and 
non-violent persuasion, may scoff at the idea that fighting 
under a common flag is essential to the development of 
national consciousness, but they are naïve if they believe 
that the EU flag today represents much more to the man in 
the street than a symbol on automobile license plates. To 
Americans, the national flag represents the unique symbol 
of their national identity, even as they value their dual 
identity as citizens of individual states. 
Third, while what is written on paper cannot guarantee a 
specific outcome for EU evolution, the importance of the 
specific terms of a proposed treaty or constitution should 
not be minimised. The provisions establish the legal 
framework and thus the future direction of the organisation, 
and so it is essential to scrutinise the provisions of the 
proposed EU Constitution. If you are a euro-sceptic, you 
should be deeply suspicious that this document is even 
termed a ‘constitution’, although the EU officially refers to 
it as the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”. 
All earlier EU agreements have been labelled purely as 
treaties. By joining both terms in an apparent oxymoron, 
one can only assume that the drafters deliberately intended 
to confuse the issue by appealing to those who want an 
eventual European federal state while simultaneously 
seeking to assuage the fears of those who fear such a 
prospect.  
Unlike the American Constitution and earlier EU treaties, 
the proposed EU Constitution directly addresses the issue 
over which Americans went to civil war: the secession of 
member states. It contains a specific provision stating that a 
member does have the right to leave the union, although it 
is less than clear as to the exact process or the 
consequences of secession.
35 
While a formal secession mechanism should give comfort 
to euro-sceptics, the inclusion of a ‘supremacy clause’ 
should not. The language in the proposed EU Constitution 
reads: 
The Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of 
the Union in exercising competences conferred on it 
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.
36 
[emphasis added] 
This language is remarkably similar to the supremacy 
clause of the American Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof … shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
37 
[emphasis added] 
                                                 
35 EU Constitution, Art. I-60. 
36 Ibid., Art. I-6. 
37 US Constitution, Art. VI. 
The supremacy clause has been one of the primary sources 
of power for the federal government in the US vis-à-vis the 
states. Yet while advocates of strong state powers have 
often questioned its application by the courts to negate 
specific state laws, no one has ever questioned its 
legitimacy, since it embodies Madison’s belief that the US 
is a compound republic, with both federal and state 
constitutions originating with the consent of the people. 
The proposed language in the EU Constitution may be said 
to simply reflect prior case law emanating from the 
European Court of Justice, yet including such a clause in 
the proposed EU Constitution makes that document more 
of a true constitution for a nation state than a treaty among 
sovereign nations. Under this clause, the EU government 
will have explicit constitutional authority to negate laws 
duly enacted by the legitimate governments of the member 
states. This leads to my next lesson.  
Fourth, the method of adoption is crucial as to whether a 
document is just a treaty among sovereign nations or a true 
constitution. Under the Western democratic political 
tradition rooted in the Enlightenment, governments are 
legitimate only if they are instituted through the consent of 
the governed. As Madison wrote, “[T]he ultimate authority, 
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people 
alone...”
38 That argues that a European Constitution will 
only be regarded as truly legitimate if EU citizens in each 
member state explicitly demonstrate their consent to be 
governed by it, whether through referendum or elected 
ratification convention, as the American Constitution was 
ratified.  
The EU has a mixed record when it comes to using 
referenda. The UK had a referendum in 1975 over whether 
to leave the European Economic Community, the EU’s 
predecessor. The British people, surprisingly to some, 
voted to remain. France put the Maastricht Treaty to a 
popular vote and it was approved by the slimmest of 
margins. Despite these and a few other examples, the 
history of EU evolution has largely been one of European 
elites moving the process of political and economic 
integration forward without popular support, and often 
against public sentiment, a history that has led numerous 
commentators to refer to the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’.
39  
It is ironic that many Europeans who favour the Treaty of 
Rome’s goal of “ever closer union” and a stronger federal 
EU are reluctant to submit the proposed EU Constitution to 
a vote of the people. While many euro-federalists fear the 
outcome of popular referenda (and Germans, in particular, 
are fearful of referenda in principle because of the Nazi 
regime’s misuse of them to justify expansion into the 
Rhineland and Austria), no constitution will ever have 
unquestioned legitimacy unless it can claim the consent of 
the European peoples. Parliaments, although elected, can 
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39 See, e.g., Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner, “The Role of 
Direct Democracy in the European Union”, CESifo Working 
Paper No. 1083, November 2003 (“The democratic deficit of the 
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only exercise the powers delegated to them by the governed 
in the basic law, the constitution. Parliamentary powers 
cannot  legitimately include instituting a new form of 
government without popular consent. “Since the 
constitution provides the rules of the political game, it is 
too dangerous to enable representatives to determine the 
constitution without the explicit consent of the citizens.”
40 
On the other hand, it is doubly ironic that many euro-
sceptics, particularly in the UK, advocate the use of a 
referendum to ratify the proposed Constitution. Obviously 
they hope a referendum will produce a negative outcome, 
but if the outcome is positive, as it was in 1975, they will 
be barred in future from claims that the EU Constitution 
and government operate without the consent of the British 
people and are therefore illegitimate.  
6.  Towards a Madisonian Model for Europe 
It is not my purpose in this article to recommend to 
Europeans whether they should approve or reject the 
proposed EU Constitution. I have simply attempted to point 
out historical similarities and differences between the 
American and European experiences with federalism, and 
to raise some important issues that Europeans should 
consider, whether they wish for an eventual United States 
of Europe or loathe such a prospect. 
Nevertheless, I will venture some predictions and 
suggestions, as follows. 
The requirement that all 25 EU members have to approve 
the proposed Constitution will prove extremely difficult to 
meet. Given the apparently rising anti-Brussels 
undercurrent in Europe today, evidenced by the surprising 
strength of anti-EU parties in the most recent European 
Parliament elections, achieving the unanimous approval of 
all member states may prove to be several bridges too far. 
Ratification referenda may be lost not only in the UK in 
2006, but perhaps in other countries as well, if recent polls 
are accurate predictors. If that happens, the process of ‘ever 
closer union’ set in motion a half-century ago will not come 
to a halt, but will instead take a logical turn towards the 
‘two-speed’ Europe that has been frequently discussed over 
the years as the EU has suffered the growing pains of 
expanded membership. In fact, a two-speed Europe already 
exists, consisting of those members in the eurozone and 
those outside. Whether the proposed EU Constitution is 
ratified or blocked, a core group of EU members, most 
likely from within the eurozone, will attempt to develop a 
Constitution for a federal union much more integrated than 
currently proposed.  
In doing so, European integrationists will – and should – 
consider the lessons from American Constitutional history, 
and look to features of the Philadelphia Constitution as they 
frame their next proposed constitution. In particular, they 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 5. The authors propose a mandatory referendum for 
any total or partial revisions of the European constitution. 
should consider the relevance to future European 
integration of the federalist principles of James Madison. 
While the EU today is already more integrated in several 
aspects than the US was during its founding era, further 
European political integration is problematic given the 
obstacles discussed above. Even though the US did not face 
those same obstacles (lack of common language, religion, 
legal system, history and national identity), the evolution of 
the US into a deeply integrated federal union only took 
place because of a horrific civil war. The prospect of such a 
method integrating Europe today is, thankfully, 
inconceivable. Nor does any state in contemporary Europe 
tolerate the crime of slavery, the eradication of which made 
the American Civil War unavoidable.
41 
Since further political integration in Europe must be 
peaceful and voluntary, the Madisonian federal model is 
one that the framers of the next European Constitution may 
find useful. Madison believed in the need for a federal 
government with the power to prevent the commercial 
anarchy caused by the self-interested protectionism of state 
governments. He also believed that the federal government 
was the most suitable, for reasons of efficiency and 
resources, to provide a common defence and foreign policy 
for the union. Beyond that, though, the states should be free 
to establish laws and policies favoured by their citizens, 
which presumed a wide diversity of domestic policies from 
state to state. Madison succinctly described the federal 
structure that he intended the 1787 Constitution to 
establish: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are 
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the 
power of taxation will for the most part be connected. 
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to 
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the State.
42 
The EU has already done much to solve the internal trade 
problem which prompted the Philadelphia Convention. 
Agreeing to give a European federal government the power 
to pursue a common foreign and defence policy will be 
much tougher and more controversial, for reasons related to 
                                                 
41 The existence of slavery in the southern states during the 
antebellum republic should not be seen as a product of the 1787 
constitutional system. As Deudney points out, “Slavery was not 
simply a regional variation within the liberal social order, but a 
relic of preliberal society, and thus the Civil War completed the 
social revolution that had begun in England and deepened in the 
struggle for American independence.” Daniel H. Deudney, “The 
Philadelphian system: Sovereignty, arms control, and balance of 
power in the American states-union, circa 1787-1861”, 
International Organization 49, Spring 1995. 
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different beliefs about the nature of sovereignty and the 
various ‘constitutional cultures’ of EU member states.
43 Yet 
within what Joschka Fischer called the ‘avant-garde’
44 – the 
core group – that goal should be possible to achieve even in 
the near term.  
A Madisonian Constitution for Europe would shift the 
power to conduct defence and foreign policy from member 
states to the federal government, but it would dramatically 
reduce the power of the federal government in social and 
domestic issues. It would have no direct taxation power, 
nor power to enforce tax harmonisation, as advocated by 
the Schröder government in Germany. Issues such as 
education, criminal justice, adultery (source of a recent 
controversy over Turkish law) and gay unions would be 
matters left to the people of the member states. The 
Madisonian view of federalism holds that most decisions 
that affect people in their daily lives should be made at the 
sub-national levels of government closest to them, where 
the diversity of the people in a large federal union can 
express itself peacefully and democratically.  
The fundamental human rights of EU citizens could be 
protected from federal violation through constitutional 
provisions, just as Madison himself authored the Bill of 
Rights that was added to the American Constitution as the 
first ten amendments. The protection of fundamental rights 
from violation by member state governments could be 
achieved through denial of membership to applicants or 
expulsion of member states who engaged in such practices.  
European federalists who draft the next Constitution should 
also look to the Philadelphia Convention for a ratification 
process. The 1787 Constitution did not require unanimity; 
only nine of the 13 states needed to ratify for it to go into 
effect among the states so ratifying.
45 No single state was 
given veto power, as each EU member has today.
46  
                                                 
43 Koenig-Archibugi, 2004. 
44 Fischer, 2000. 
45 US Constitution, Art. VII. This was another contentious issue 
surrounding the launch of the new republic. The explicit directive 
to most delegations at the Philadelphia Convention from their 
state legislatures had been to revise the Articles of Confederation 
and nothing more. The method for revising the Articles consisted 
of approval in the Congress and the approval of every state 
legislature (Arts., Art. XIII). By choosing to submit ratification of 
the Constitution to conventions of the people, and by requiring 
only nine of the thirteen states to ratify it, the framers finally 
revealed that their project was not merely a revision of the 
Articles, but a new Constitution for a federal republic, a goal they 
had managed to conceal throughout the convention summer of 
1787. 
46 Had the Constitution required the unanimous approval of all 
thirteen states, the new federal union would have died at birth. 
North Carolina initially voted against ratification. Rhode Island 
put the matter to a popular referendum, where the vote was 
overwhelmingly against ratification. Rhode Island only joined the 
constitutional union two years after it had begun operations when 
the new national government began to apply the same tariffs to 
products from Rhode Island that it applied to imports from a 
foreign country. 
A Madisonian Constitution for Europe that gives the 
federal government the power to enforce freedom of 
commerce across state borders, to establish a common 
currency to ensure economic integration, to conduct a 
common defence and foreign policy, but which otherwise 
leaves issues affecting what Madison called the “lives, 
liberties and properties of the people” to the member states, 
would, I predict, be far more comprehensible in its 
simplicity and appealing to the people of Europe than the 
currently proposed EU Constitution.  
A Madisonian federal model could also make additional 
EU expansion more palatable to both old and new 
members, even into countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey and Ukraine, which are very different socially and 
culturally from the original EU base in Western Europe. 
The pre-civil war American republic expanded rapidly 
through a process in which new states voluntarily agreed to 
join the federal system established by the 1787 
Constitution, rather than form independent states or 
alliances with outside powers:  
In 1787 the thirteen American states were located only 
upon the Atlantic coast, but by 1861 Union territory 
stretched to the Pacific, covering an area nearly five 
times as large, and the number of states in the Union had 
nearly tripled … In the annals of realpolitik, it is often 
forgotten that the Philadelphian union absorbed 
peacefully Utah and Vermont, two quasi-independent 
states, and California and Texas, which were 
independent and recognized as such by both the United 
States and the European powers… In part, their vigorous 
pursuit of Anschluss can be attributed to the fact that 
they were not fully extinguished as states by joining the 
union but rather were preserved as semiautonomous 
units within it and shared in union government in 
proportion to their population.
47 
Madison predicted that a large and extended republic was 
more likely to protect individual liberties than a small 
republic, because the larger the republic the less likely that 
individual special interest groups, which he called 
‘factions’, could dominate and violate minority rights.
48 
Madison also realised that the more diverse the republic, 
the more that governmental power over people’s daily lives 
must not be concentrated at the centre, but should be 
devolved to lower levels of government to reflect the 
people’s diversity. One might even say that Madison was 
the first ‘multiculturalist’ because he believed that the 
individual cultures of sub-national political units should not 
be smothered by rules and laws dictated from a central 
government. He described the 1787 Constitution as forming 
“a happy combination” with “the great and aggregate 
interests being referred to the national, the local and 
particular, to the state legislatures.”
49 Applying Madison’s 
insight will foster EU expansion by protecting self-
                                                 
47 Deudney, 1995. 
48 James Madison, The Federalist Number 10, 22 November 
1787, see also Federalist 51. 
49 ––––––––, Federalist 10. 12 | Mark C. Christie 
government in each member state from interference from 
an EU federal government.  
A Madisonian Constitution could perhaps even close the 
wide chasm between many euro-federalists and euro-
sceptics, because the federalists would get a European 
government with the power to conduct a common defence 
and foreign policy, an essential attribute of any national 
government, while the sceptics would be reassured that 
such a government would not be a threat to individual and 
economic liberties and would leave the people of Britain, 
just to choose a random example, free to establish their own 
domestic and social policies, without interference from 
Brussels.  
Moreover, such an outcome would ironically be far closer 
to the federalist vision of many of America’s own founders, 
including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, than the 
present-day US with its ever-expanding national 
government voraciously intruding into more and more areas 
historically reserved to the states, such as education, 
criminal and family law.  
7. Conclusion 
Europeans who favour the creation of an American-style 
federal union and those who fear such a prospect would 
both benefit from the lessons of American constitutional 
history. Whether the proposed EU Constitution is ratified or 
fails, European federalists should consider developing a 
true constitution for a European federal union along the 
model that James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and other 
American federalists envisioned at the founding of the 
American federal republic. A Madisonian Constitution for 
Europe may even prove acceptable both to many euro-
federalists and euro-sceptics, and thus advance the cause of 
European integration. 
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